Just a couple of things:

1. Popper never considered any theory to be verified or confirmed. He rejected induction.
2. According to what you have written above, Popper’s own theory of demarcation between science and non-science would have to be considered pseudo-science.

Ultimately Popper’s proposed definition of science *does* exclude his own definition of science. Popper’s ideas about demarcation are not scientific as far as Popper was concerned. But Popper did not recognize this as a problem. He didn’t feel every good idea had to be scientific.

This is why some of Popper’s students have said a definition of science isn’t important, we should instead look at Popper’s ideas regarding science as the proper use of evidence in an investigation of the truth.

Popper emphatically rejected that any theory can be verified or confirmed. See the first two essays in _Conjectures and Refutations_.

At least one problem is who bears responsibility for the truth. I view it this way. If you say the *observation* is responsible, then you have a sense of you can be right come what may. You cease to question your theory. However, if responsibility always falls on each individual’s shoulders, when there is a disagreement, we have to engage one another. We have to debate and argue.

Popper’s philosophy was basically, “I may be wrong, and you may be right, and through a discussion we might get nearer the truth.”

He was troubled when people would point out some type of *justification* for an idea absolving themselves of the responsibility for having accepted the idea as the truth. In the case where there is disagreement, he didn’t want us to stand pigheadedly by our *justification*, but instead to admit potential fallibility and engage in argument. Of course, we *do* probably get it right sometimes, so hopefully in an earnest discussion and appraisal of an idea, we will get nearer to the truth.

I know that the main epistemological problem – as far as Popper is concerned, of course – is the problem of differentiation between science and non-science. But still, by spotting the false in a theory it does not mean that the theory is verified, but only confirmed. When a theory refuses to expose itself to an empirical falsifiable test ought to be considered as pseudo-science (Marxism, Psycanalisis, etc.)

I particularly referred to the “white swan” example of Popper’s falsifibiality theory (observation statement). Let’s take the classical example of the “White Swan”:

Proposition: “All swans are white”
Result: FALSE, because somebody observed a black swan. By means of observation, the proposition is false and therefore (according to Popper) it is a genuine scientific issue.

Proposition: “All Gods speak Arabic”
Result: FALSE, because of a theoretical observation of an American God who speaks English would falsify the proposition, making divine languages a matter of science — notwithstanding the fact that observing the gods would be unfeasible.

Popper in _The Open Society and Its Enemies_ separates out what he calls norms (values — moral decision making) and facts. I urge you to read chapter 5 of his book. He strongly felt that norms could not be derived from facts. It’s very important to understand this if you want to understand his ideas about science.

Now, consider the following two rules:
1. You should be a good driver.
2. You should not drive any faster than 55 mph.

Which one of those rules to you feel more comfortable with.

Popper is basically saying at least some of the following:
a. We each have to decide about whether or not to hold any theory true or not. Speaking metaphorically only, it’s always an issue of conscience.
b. A good scientific theory, is like a good rule, we can tell what is expected by the theory, such that we can understand what would *not* follow from the theory. That is the theory is testable. (In a limited sense, observation is besides the point. What counts as an observation must be decided by us each individually. The responsibility for the truth falls not on the observation, but on each of our own individual shoulders.)
c. Finally, each theory could be wrong, so we should take a fallible approach.

It’s important to understand that for Popper metaphysics is perfectly fine. It’s important. The difference between metaphysics and pseudo-science lies in that metaphysics doesn’t pretend to be any more than it is, pseudo-science does. Pseudo-science pretends to be science, when it is not.

Some of Popper’s students and strongest advocates argue that so long as we understand Popper’s central points, worrying about what is science and what is not is superfluous, the main point being to try and always keep our ideas open to criticism.

What you say above doesn’t seem to at all approximate what Popper was attempting to say. I doubt I’ve got it exactly right myself, but I do think what I’ve stated here is closer to it than what you’ve stated.